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Summary  findings
Djankov investigates the relationship between ownership  the Kyrgyz Republic) had the highest proportion  of
structure and enterprise restructuring in six newly  ownership shares held by outside investors (37 percent
independent states: Georgia, Kazakstan, the Kyrgyz  and 21.2 percent, respectively).
Republic, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine.  Foreign ownership is positively associated with
He documents the changing pattern of ownership in  enterprise restructuring at high ownership levels (above
960 privatized manufacturing companies from 1995-97.  30 percent of shares).
There are large differences in ownership structure  By contrast, the relationship between management
across countries, differences that seem to be determined  ownership and enterprise restructuring is non-
by the method of privatization pursued. Enterprises in  monotonic, positive at low (below 10 percent) or high
countries where the privatization programs favored  (above 30 percent) levels.
incumbent managers (Georgia and Ukraine) ended with  Finally, Djankov shows that ownership by outside local
heavy ownership by managers (an average 53.6 percent  investors or the state is not significantly correlated with
and 46.2 percent, respectively). Countries that used  restructuring.
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1.  Introduction
The  literature  on  ownership  structure  and  enterprise  restructuring  during  the
transition  from plan  to  market  consists  primarily of  studies  based  on  evidence  from
Central European and Baltic countries.'  This is hardly surprising since these countries
entered the  liberalization process  early and have  been  subject to  significant research
interest due to their imminent accession to the European Union.  At the opposite, little
research has been devoted to Newly Independent States (NIS) countries. 2 Reasons for
this neglect abound.  In the early years of transition, most NIS countries were struggling
to  create their  govemrnent structures and legislation  after decades of political  control
from Moscow.  Some were involved in either civil wars or border conflicts.  Lastly, the
absence  of established  systems of  data  collection by  governrnent  agencies precluded
rigorous empirical work.
Most NIS  enterprises  entered the reform period  from  a  different  set of  initial
conditions when compared to enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe.  For example,
NIS  countries were  more highly integrated in their input and  output markets  than the
Central European countries.3 Central-planning bureaucrats arranged cooperation between
enterprises  even  if  they  were  located  within  a  few  miles  from  each  other  across
republican borders.  More importantly,  all international trade  was  channeled through
foreign trade organizations in Moscow.  The dependence on central distribution meant
that  enterprise managers  were  never involved in  marketing  their  products  abroad, or
producing goods to meet international standards and technical requirements. Finally, the
privatization process  in most NIS  countries favored incumbent managers, unlike most
other transition economies where mass privatization and sales to outsiders were pursued
rigorously.  These differences suggest that the relation between ownership structure and
enterprise restructuring in the NIS may be worth investigating, as many of the stylized
facts documented for enterprises in more advanced transition  economies may not hold
true.
In  this  paper  we  investigate  the  relation  between  ownership  structure  and
enterprise perforrnance in the NIS, using detailed survey data from Georgia, Kazakstan,
the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine. The surveys were conducted by World
I  Those include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic,
and Slovenia. The two most comprehensive studies are Frydman et al, (1997) and Pohl et al, (1997).
2  There is, however, a large number of  empirical studies on Russian enterprises.  See  Earle and Estrin
(1997)  and  Linz  and  Krueger  (1998)  for  reviews  of  the  literature.  Estrin  and  Rosevear  (1998)
investigates the relation between ownership structure and enterprise restructuring in Ukraine.
3A  theoretical discussion on the effect of the collapse of the Soviet Union on economic relations between
enterprises is given in Blanchard and Kremer (1997).
2Bank consultants as part of private sector reviews in late 1997 and early 1998. Excluded
from the survey are enterprises in the remaining six NIS countries (Arnenia,  Azerbaijan,
Belaruas,  Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) for which data were not available.
We document the changing pattemr  of ownership in 960 privatized manufacturing
companies across the six countries in the 1995-97 period.  There are large differences in
the ownership structure across countries, and these differences seem to be determined by
the type of privatization methods pursued. In particular, enterprises in countries where the
privatization programs  favored incumbent managers  (Georgia and  Ukraine) ended  up
with large ownership by managers (53.6% and 46.2% of total ownership on average) by
1997.  Enterprises in countries which chose equal opportunity mass privatization as their
primary privatization  method  (Kazakstan and  the Kyrgyz Republic)  have the  highest
ownership shares of outside investors (37%/0  and 21.2% respectively).
We  show  that  foreign  ownership  is  positively  associated  with  enterprise
restructuring  at high  ownership levels  (above 30%0  of total  shares).  In  contrast,  the
relation between  manager  ownership  and  enterprise  restructuring  in  non-monotonic,
positive at low (below  10%) or high (above 30%) stakes, but negative at intermediate
(between IO% and 3  o0%)  levels.  We also show that ownership by outside local investors
or the state is not significantly correlated with restructuring. Finally, employee ownership
is  beneficial  to  labor  productivity  growth  at  low  ownership  levels,  but  becomes
insignificant at higher levels, and for the other two restructuring measures.
The paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section 2  reviews  some  of  the  existing
literature on the effect of ownership structure on firm performance, drawing on studies
from both  mature  and  transition  economies.  Section 3 details  the data  used  and the
methodology  for its  collection.  Section 4 provides  statistics on changes in ownership
structure.  Section  5 uses regression analysis to  study the relation between  ownership
structure and enterpnrse restructuring, using three alternative measures  of restructuring
(labor productivity growth, asset sales, minor renovations), and investigates whether this
relation is monotonic for different types of ownership.  Section 6 concludes.
2.  Ownership  Structure  and Firm  Performance
The increasing availability of large data sets on firrns listed on the stock market
over the last twenty years has greatly expanded the empirical literature  examining the
effects of different types of ownership structures on corporate performance. Most of these
studies have focused on US companies, relatively little work has been done in developing
or transition economies.  We outline below the stylized facts that have been uncovered in
the empirical literature to-date, while cautioning the reader that these facts may not apply
to enterprises in transition economies.
Manager-ial Ownership.  The  empirical  work  on  the  association  between
managerial  ownership and coiporate performance dates back more than sixty years  to
3Berle and Means (1933).  They contended that diffuse ownership yields significant power
in  the  hands  of  managers  whose  interests  do  not  coincide  with  the "interest  of
shareholders.  As  a  result, corporate  resources  are not  used  for  the maximization  of
shareholders'  value.  Studies  for  the  US  (e.g.,  Morck,  Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1988;
McConnell and Servaes, 1990) find a (non-linear) relation between managerial ownership
concentration and corporate performance.
Some  compelling  evidence  on  profit-diminishing  managerial  behavior  comes
from acquisition announcements in the US.  Many studies show that bidder returns on the
announcement of acquisitions driven by managers are often negative (Roll (1986) surveys
the evidence). Another strand of the literature focuses on managers  directly threatened
with the loss of private benefits of control.  These are studies of management resistance to
takeovers.  Walkling and Long (1984) find that managerial resistance to value-increasing
takeovers is less likely  when top managers have a direct  financial interest in  the deal
either through share ownership or golden parachutes. In contrast, Malatesta and Walkling
(1988) find that  firms which have experienced challenges to management  control, the
adoption of devices to make takeovers costly, reduce shareholders' wealth.  Finally, there
is some indirect evidence on the importance of management entrenchment.  Johnson et al.
(1985) find that sudden executive deaths - in plane crushes or from heart attacks - are
often  accompanied  by  increases  in  the  share  price  of  companies  these  executives
managed.  The price increases are largest for major conglomerates, whose managers built
vast empires without returning to shareholders.
Employee  Ownership.  This  category  of  ownership  has  not  been  extensively
studied.  It has been argued that unionized employees more likely seek control of a firn,
but the actual monitoring role of employee owners has not been documented.  We argue
that employees, like small shareholders, may be  less able (and face little incentive) to
monitor firn performance.
Individual  Ownership. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argued that individual block-
owners have strong incentive to monitor management because of their non-diversifiable
holding in the corporation. Consistent evidence is reported by Friend and Lang (1988)
that the presence of individual block-holders forces management to  use more debt for
disciplinary purposes.  Other  studies (Coase,  1988; Demsetz  and  Lehn,  1985) argue,
however,  that  any  relation  between  individual  ownership  concentration  and  firm
performance may be spunrous. While greater ownership concentration results in stronger
incentives  to  monitor,  the  expected  gain  from  active  monitoring  and  the  costs  of
alternative  ownership  structures  vary  across  firrns.  If  transaction  costs  inhibiting
investors from taking value-maximizing positions in firns  are low each firm would have
the "right"  ownership structure and there may not be a relationship from ownership to
perfornance.  One thus needs to be cognizant of the two-way relation between individual
ownership and performance.
4Go-erninent Ownership. In case of state ownership, politicians will  likely have
interests  in  addition  to  maximizing enterprse  restructuring,  such  as  preserving jobs.
There is -eneral evidence that state-owned firms are less efficient than pnivately owned
inns are (Megginson et al.. 1994).  In the case of East Asia, however, it has been argued
that  the state has had  a  beneficial  role in  stirmulating long-terrr  development (World
Bank,  1994). it  has done  so by offering special treatments including protection  rrorn
nmnpGrt  competition,  offers of govemment contracts,  or participation in subsidized export
o1r1onon mrograrn,  which may also lead to increased short-term performance. It is thus
not clear a priori what the relation is.
Omside  Ownership. Better perfornance  of  firms may be  due  to  signaling and
special abilities of outside owners.  Some corporate  outside investors, for example, may
be  mnore  able to  evaluate  firms-based  on their  better  information.  Other  corporate
inivestors  may be better owners as they may have access to technology  or know-how  ,not-
a>. aijaole  to the firn (e.g.,  foreign investors) o. they may have special monitoring  skills
'e.g.. trade  ,  .croditors  which are owners).  which  may  raise the valuation  or profitability  of
.ke  -. m.  Cn th'e ot.her hand,  the presence  of corporate owvners  may  harm the firm's
,er+.oron-ncre  s.nce  these  owners  may  collude  with  incumbent  management  to  expropriate
;.e  i.Rom  om  her  shareholders.  This  argument  is  5Consistent  with  the  observation  by
i''"9-,  tir a  e board  of  directors ofI  -S  firms  often consists  of  representatives  of
J  1e-.  cob,.o.iu  and reacts too slowly in removing bad management.
L arc,o o-uts  de  ow-ners in  generai  have  opportunities  to  expropilate  value,
ar icular  I  vmne the  einnonty  shareh olders  are not  well  protected.  WNkhen  financial
institutions are iarge owners, conflicts of interest are a further possibility of expropriation
of  -nrnnr.y  shareholders.  Comnmercial  banks could face conflicts when they are lar-e
crecdtors of the firms in which they hold  equity s-akes. There can be direct dilution of
othe- coit.y  'holders for the benefit  of the baki.  for exarnple, through  higher leniding
spreans.  F4ina-incial  institutions  related to baniks  may also have the interests of the barnk  as
a credlitor  ir, mird  wiwhen  deciding in which company to in-vest  and howv  to value a f1lmm
Offsetting  thiese  effects can be the better monrtonng  of firms and their management by a
financial inst.itution,  when it has an equity stake.  This can be because it then has mnore
access to information and because it will have more interest in monitoring. Because the
confilicts  of interest and improved monitoring  effects go in  opposite direction, the net
effect  of  Einancial institutions'  ownersnip on  the  valuation  of  the  frnms  and  its
pr ofitab-  ility is urclear.
The e-vidence  for transition economies is -very scarce. A detailed survcy of case
study evidlence (Carlin et al, 1995) shows, for a sample of Czech, Hungarian,  Russlan,
anfd  Buls,Tian  enterprises, that firms owned by foreig-n  investors perform  -best, but there is
Hifle  difference between local insiler  (manager and employees) and outsider dominated
- - rvdrpj  e. al. (1997), using a  large data set of Czech, Hunlgan'an, and Polish
ent.erpr1ss,  find  that  private  firms  outperform  state-c'mned firms,  but  thiat Outsider-
dorniirared  firms do not outpeform  insider-dominated firmt.s.  Smith et al. (1997)  find that
oreain,  dominated enterprises in Slovenia have the highlest growth in value-added, while
5insider-controlled firms have a higher average growth when compared to finns controlled
by outside local investors.  Earle and Estrin (1997) and Linz and Krueger (1998) find no
evidence of a  robust relation between types of ownership and enterprise restructuring in
Russia, using several alternative specifications.  Similar conclusions are reached in Estrin
and Rosevear (1998) for Ukrainian enterprises.
While  indicative,  the  aforementioned  studies  on transition  economies  may be
incomplete  in  their  investigations  of  the  relation  between  ownership  structure  and
enterprise performance, since they do not look at evidence for non-monotonic correlation
patterns.  In most cases, this is due to the lack of appropriate data.  The contribution of
this  study to  the  transition  literature  is  that  we  explicitly  test  for  the  possibility  of
piecewise-linear associations and find significant evidence to suggest that this relation is
often more complex than previously argued.
3.  The Sample
The empirical work on enterpise  restructuring in the NIS has been constrained by
the lack of  firm-level data.  In the six countries under  investigation, only  Russia and
Ukraine maintained  an uninterrupted industry  census in  the reform period.  The data
were, however, of limited use for empirical work due to the hyper-inflation during the
early period (1992-94).  The other four countries initiated independent industrial census
in  1994-95. Those, however, covered only former state-owned enterprises.  Frequently,
enterprises which changed their ownership form and re-registered were also dropped from
the data or treated  as new  entities.  Furthernore,  the census did  not  include  detailed
infornation  on ownership types.
To avoid problems with quantitative data collected by national statistical offices,
and  to  better  understand  the  nature  of  qualitative  changes,  we  utilize  a  survey
methodology  following on the pioneering work of Pinto  et al (1993)  and Carlin et al
(1995) in Central European transition economies, and Hendley et al (1997) and Linz and
Krueger (1998) in Russia.  All surveys were designed as part of private  sector reviews,
conducted by World Bank  consultants, and distributed  to enterprise  managers in their
native  language.  The  survey  results  were  then  processed  simultaneously,  to  avoid
possible biases.  In each of the six countries, a number of enterpnrses - in total over two
hundred - were visited by the author in the pilot phase of the surveys.
The sample was restricted to privatized manufacturing enterprises.  We focus on
manufacturing  firms  since  those  are  likely  to  have  experienced  specific  difficulties
(output declines, loss of markets, need for quality upgrading) which are not characteristic
of other firTns. We also exclude state-owned enterprises from the analysis, since a large
(and fairly consistent) literature comparing the performance of state-owned and privatized
enterprises already exists (see EBRD, 1997 for a survey).  Another strand of the empirical
literature  has  examined  the  perfonnance  and  ownership  structure  of  new  private
6enterpnses (Konings, 1998). In contrast, the primary goal of this paper is to shed light on
the relation between  ownership  structure  and  firn  perfornance  once  a  former state-
owned enterprise is (at least partially) in private hands.
The samples contain different number of firms in each country (Table  1).  The
largest sample is for Russia - 682 enterprises, the smallest is for Ukraine - 49 enterprises.
Across the eight manufacturing  industries surveyed,  the largest number of  enterprises
(224) is in the Food  and Beverage industry, while the smallest number (94) is in  the
Chemicals industry.  The  distribution  of  enterprises  across  sector is  relatively  even,
ensurng  the ability to control for sectors in the regression analysis in Sections 5 and 6.
There is also sufficient sampling across regions to at least in part capture the behavior of
enterprises in each country.4
The differences across countries are mostly due to data limitations - the Georgian,
Kyrgyz, Moldovan, and Russian surveys were developed over the course of two years
with substantial help from local consultants.  The Kazak and Ukrainian surveys, on the
other  hand,  originated  as  more  limited  exercises.  In  total,  the  study  covers  960
manufacturing  firms  across  the  six  countries.  The  data  are  not  representative.  The
samples constitute  a  small  share  of  the manufacturing  firms  in  each  country.  The
selection bias is,  however, m'inimized whenever possible.  Surveyed  enterprises were
drawn  from  larger  samples  of  enterprise  units.  The  latter  lists  typically  came  from
business  registry  data.  Enterprises were  then  sorted  alphabetically  (using  the  Slavic
alphabet) by name and random draws were taken. The sample does not  include firms
located in the autonomous regions of Transnistria in Moldova and Abhasia in Georgia.
While there is a possible selection bias and a small sample bias in the data, the insights of
this  study  are less  dependent  on  such  deficiencies  than,  say,  studies  which  estimate
productivity growth of the economy.
The  sample is unique in  several dimensions. First, it  is based  on  a  consistent
survey methodology to study ownership structure and enterprise performance across the
six NIS  countries.  Second,  it contains  enterprises  from  different  sectors  and  regions
within a country thus allowing the researcher to control for the importance of sectoral and
regional  factors  in  finn  perfornance.  Finally,  it  covers  a  dynamic  penrod  in  the
transformation process when redistribution of ownership was rapidly taking place.  This
in turn enables us to document the evolution of ownership structure.
4  The distribution  of enterprises  by regions is as follows: Georgia (Tbilisi - 101 fiums,  Kutaisi - 14,
Rustavi  - 7, Gori - 7): Kazakstan  (Almaty  - 51, Karagandi  - 11):  Kyrgyz Republic  (Bishkek  - 33.
Osh - 14.  Jalal-Abad  - 17,  Talas  - 4, Issyk-Kul  - 11): Moldova  (Kishinev  - 101, Balti - 14, Soroca
- 12, Drochia  - 4, Nisporeni  - 3. Dobrugea  - 3); Russia (Altai  - 95, Voronezh  - 96, Moscow  - 179.
Novosibirsk - 43,  Saratov - 92,  Yekaterininburg  - 177): Ukraine  (  Kiev - 19, Lviv - 16,
Dnepropetrovsk  - 14).
7Table 1: The Enterprise Sample By Sectors
Country  Georgia  Kazakstan Kyrgyz  Rep.  Moldova  Russia  Ukraine  Total
Metals  16  6  5  14  61  4  106
Chemicals  13  5  5  11  53  5  94
Machinery  23  1i  7  22  100  9  172
Wood and Furniture  5  4  5  8  97  2  121
Construction Materials  7  8  8  16  102  6  147
Textiles and Apparel  14  12  19  24  98  11  178
Food and Beverage  42  14  25  33  101  9  224
Pharmaceuticals  9  2  5  9  70  3  98
Total Manufacturing  129  62  79  137  682  49  960
4.  Ownership Structure of NIS Firms
In many NIS countries, the privatization process favored insiders  either through
management-employee  buy-outs  (MEBOs)  or  through  voucher  privatization  with
significant concessions to insiders (Table 2). Georgia was the only country which opted
for voucher privatization with  concessions  to managers  and  MEBOs  as the prevalent
privatization  methods.  Ukraine  started  with  MEBOs  but  later  introduced  a  voucher
scheme  for a  limited number  of enterprises  (also see  Estrin  and Rosevear,  1998). In
contrast, Kazakstan and the Kyrgyz Republic initiated equal access voucher programs,
but  cancelled  their  second  waves  and  turned  to  sales  to  outsiders  and  MEBOs
respectively. In Russia, managers and employees were allowed to choose among three
different privatization options.  The vast majority of enterprises went  for 51% insider
ownership with  the rest  (initially) retained by  the  state or given to  investment funds.
Many subsequent privatization deals were struck directly with outside local investors or
managers.  Finally,  Moldova  combined  a  voucher  program  with  sales  to  outsiders.
Voucher holders could invest directly in companies or go through the investment funds.
There were  restrictions  on the  shares bought  in  each  company by  investment funds,
although they could buy majority stakes in some companies. 5
The methods of privatization chosen in each country determined to a large degree
the ownership structure that evolved subsequently. In particular, enterprises in countries
where  the privatization programs  favored incumbent managers  (Georgia and  Ukraine)
ended up with large ownership by managers (53.6% and 46.2%  of total  ownership on
average)  by  1997.  Enterprises  in  countries  which  chose  equal  opportunity  mass
privatization as their primary privatization method (Kazakstan and the Kyrgyz Republic)
had  high  ownership  shares  of  outside  investors  (37%  and  21.2%  respectively).
Enterprises in Moldova  and Russia had more diversified  ownership on average.  This
5The  eight  largest investment  funds  in Moldova  in 1997  owned less  than 25 percent of equity  in 62 percent
of  companies  from  their  portfolios;  between  25  and  50 percent  of  the  equity  in  14 percent  of
companies; controlling packages of more than 50 percent of shares in 24 percent of companies.
8does not suggest, however, a pattern of dispersed ownership in any given firin. Rather. it
is a consequence of the different privatization paths followed across groups of-firms.
Table  2: Methods  of Privatization
Country  Sale to  Vouchers:  Vouchers:  MEBOs
Outsiders  Equal Access  Concessions
to Insiders
Georgia  Primary  Secondary
Kazakstan  Secondaiy  Primary
Kyrgyz  Republic  Primlary  Secondary
Moldova  Secondarv  Primary
Russia  Secondary  Primary  Tertiary
Ukraine  Secondary  Primary
Source:  EBRD,  1997,  table  5.7.
With  the  exception  of  Moldova  where  managers  and  employees  cwned
approximately the same share in  1997 (18.3% and  19.7%),  managers had accumulated
significant stakes by buying out employees and state shares in the 1995-97 period.  This
pattern is particularly stnrking in UIkraine,  where in two years managers amassed 46.2%
of all shares on average.  The relevant statistics may be, however, the overall holdings of
insicders  (managers and employees).  This is because managers may control the employee
vote in return for implicit job security.
The state still controls small minority stakes in all countries.  In Moldova, about a
quarter 0(23.8%)  of the stock of privatized companies is held by the state, while Kyrgyz
privatized firns  have only a 5.6% residual state control. These numbers underestimate the
power of the state in influencing the restructuring process of enterprises.  Managers of
Ukrainian and Kazak firms, for example, frequently complained that even if the state had
a 5% stake in their company, the state representative on the Board of Directors could still
block many decisions.  In Moldova, interviewed enterprise managers  complained that
they were discouraged from firing workers by state-appointed directors.
Outside foreign investors still represent a minor share of the stock in the sample,
the most in Kazak enterprises (6.8%), the least in LJkrainian enterpnrses - iess than 1%/e.
The  reason  is partly  due  to  the  absence  of  developed  secondary  markets  in  the six
countries, where foreigners (and outsiders in general) could buy stocks.  Stock exchanges
do not  exist in  Georgia and Kazakstan,  list a small number  of  companies  (40 in  the
Kyrgyz Republic,  65  in UJkraine), or have restrictions  on the participation  of  -oreign
investors (Moldova and Russia).
In all six countries, the changes inI ownership structure between  1995 and 199,
increased insider (and in particular, managerial) ownership at the expense of state and
outsider  ownership.  There  are  still  wide  differences  across  countries,  with  insiders
owning as much as two-thirds of shares in Georgian companies, and only 37.6% in Kazak
firms.  State-ownership still remains non-trivial in many companies, however.  The sale
9of these remaining shares to private investors may rapidly re-shape the current ownership
structure.
Table 3: Changes in the ownership structure, % of total
(Means)
The shares are unweighted averages.  State ownership includes property under local and municipal
administrations.  Outside Local Investors include investment funds.




1995  41.5  9.4  41.0  4.9  1.0  2.0
1997  53.6  10.4  23.3  8.0  2.2  2.2
Kazakstan
1995  23.1  10.7  34.8  23.6  4.4  3.4
1997  29.4  8.2  16.1  30.2  6.8  9.3
Kyrgyz Republic
1995  28.1  38.3  12.4  16.8  2.2  2.2
1997  34.4  36.4  5.6  18.9  2.3  2.4
Moldova
1995  7.2  21.6  38.6  24.7  0.3  7.6
1997  18.3  19.7  23.8  22.6  2.1  13.5
Russia
1995  25.4  26.0  23.5  23.4  1.6  0.1
1997  36.3  23.3  14.7  21.5  3.8  0.4
Ukraine
1995  14.6  23.6  42.6  18.9  0.3  0.2
1997  46.2  15.3  15.4  17.7  0.9  4.5
5.  Ownership Types and Restructuring
5.1. Restructuring Measures
The empirical literature  on enterprise behavior during transition utilizes  a wide
array of restructuring measures, based  either on accounting or qualitative information.
There is no prevalent methodology, as the concept of restructuring differs across studies.
For  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  we  define  restructuring  as  changes  in  operations,
interactions, and motivation towards success in  a changing market  environment.  This
definition is proposed in Ericson (1998) and  captures the  essence of the restructuring
changes, some which will be forced by the behavior of other market players, while others
will be pursued by management and owners.
Following  on  this  definition,  we  use  three  complementary  measures  of
restructuring: increases in labor productivity (sales per worker growth), assets sales, and
renovations at the factory to improve working conditions. The first measure is based on
10accounting data and is most often used in previous empirical work (Frydman et al, 1997;
Pohl et al., 1997; Estrin and Rosevear, 1998; Linz and Krueger,  1998) as it-depends on
both  "defensive" or "passive"  restructuring  (reduction in  excess employment), and on
"active"  restructuring  (increase  in  sales  volume).  The  measure  may,  however,  be
misleading  since substantial  improvements in labor productivity  need not  arise from
"pro-active" restructuring, particularly when it is accompanied by  a substantial drop in
output (Ericson, 1998). Instead, labor productivity growth may simply account for a low
initial level of efficiency, i.e., for the elimination of waste.
We hence use two other measures of active restructunrng (asset sales and minor
renovations), following Barberis et al. (1996).  Both measures (along with positive real
investment, changes in  management,  sunpliers,  customers, etc.)  can  be  argued  to  be
highly correlated with restructuring.  As discrete variables, they diminish the information
on restructuring  across firms and  are cruder than accounting measures.  For example,
what  do  different  types  of  minor  renovations  reveal  about  the  willingness  for
restructuring? Does it matter how much revenues the enterprise received from asset sales?
Or were such sales just  another form of asset stripping?  These questions are difficult as
managers (understandably) are not forthcoming with their answers.
In a previous version of the paper, we also used the share of barter as an indicator
of restructuring.  The argument made was that barter is associated with significant costs
to enterprises (see, for example, Hendley et al., 1997) and a high share of barter implies
efficiency losses.  Linz and Krueger (1998), however, use barter as is an indicator of the
ability of managers to man-euver,  manipulate, and survive, by maintaining their enterprise
in  operations. Ericson (1998),  in contrast,  argues that  barter  involves the building  of
wasteful facilities to manufacture and process barter products,  and  is an  economically
inefficient activity.  In the absence of a consensus on the appropriateness of this measure,
we drop it from the analysis.
In  the  enterpnrse sample  here,  Georgian  enterprises  show  the  largest  annual
growth in labor productivity during 1995-97 - 19.2% on average (Table 4).  Enterprises in
the Kyrguz Republic have the second highest growth - 14.6%,  followed by enterprises in
Russia, Kazakstan, and Ukraine. The least growth is recorded  by Moldovan enterprises -
9.4%.  These numbers compare favorably with labor productivity growth in the initial
transition period in Central and Eastern Europe, where labor productivity grew at 7% on1
average (Pohl et al.,  1997). It  is important to remember that Georgian enterprises had
virtually ceased operations during the civil war in  1993-94, and the sales growth was
coming  from  a  low  base.  Smaller,  but  significant  interruptions  of  operations  had
occurred in most of the other NIS sample countries.
The sale or leasing of  assets (equipment, buildings)  is  our second  measure of
restructuring.  Managers can use the proceeds from such sales to finance working capital.
This indicator also reveals management quality: managers who refuse to sell assets in the
hope  of "better  times"  will likely  cease operations  altogether.  The  largest  share  of
enterprises which sold assets was in the Kyrgyz Republic - a third of all enterprises either
TIleased buildings and space or sold some assets.  Interestingly, most clients came from
China and Pakistan. In some NIS  countries the sale of assets was either pfohibited or
levied  with  large taxes.  In  Georgia, the  country with  the  least  asset  sales  (18.2%),
enterprises paid a tax on the difference between the sale price and the price of assets
(artificially bloated)  during privatization. In Ukraine,  some equipment was still under
mobilization reserve (the enterprise had to maintain it in case of war) and could not be
sold.
Table 4: Measures of Restructuring
(unweighted averages)
Country  Sales  per Worker  Sale of Assets  Minor  Renovations
Growth,  p.a. 1995-97  (% of enterprises)  (%  of enterprises)
Georgia  19.2  18.2  24.2
Kazahkstan  11.4  24.3  39.2
Kyrgyz Rep.  14.6  33.6  44.2
Moldova  9.4  23.7  29.6
Russia  12.1  24.6  30.2
Ukraine  10.8  21.1  52.6
The  last  indicator  of  operational  restructuring  is  the  undertaking  of  minor
renovations to improve working conditions at the factory.  This  measure is highest in
Ukraine (52.6%) and the Kyrgyz Republic (39.2%), and lowest in Georgia (24.2%) and
Moldova (29.6%).  It is highly correlated with the sale of assets measure - the simple
correlation coefficient is 0.68 for the sample as a whole. It correlates poorly with labor
productivity  growth  - the  simple  correlation  coefficient  is  0.37.  These  correlations
support Ericson's  argument that labor productivity need not be  associated with  active
restructuring.
5.2. Linear Relations
To  determine  the  linear  relation  between  ownership  structure  and  enterprise
restructuring,  we  use  a  multivariate  regression  analysis which  controls  for  industry-
specific  and country-specific  factors.  Although  two  of our independent variables  are
discrete, we use OLS with heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors rather than probits
to make the comparisons of regressions and the interpretation of results  easier.  In an
earlier draft, we have performed probits as well - the implied probabilities are very close
to the OLS estimates.
We use as right-hand side variables the continuous ownership shares by each type
of owner as reported in Table 3.  Ownership by individuals is used as the numeraire.  For
robustness purposes, regressions are also run where the holdings of these four types of
owners are taken as discrete variables (not reported).  Those show similar results and are
omitted from the discussion. In alternative specifications, we also controlled for the effect
of sectors, size (proxied by employment or assets), location, and access to bank financing.
12Those controls did not yield any consistent paramneter  estimates and are dropped from te
analysis here. The size dummy is not  significant in  any  specification,  location in the
capital city is positive  and significant onk'  for asset sales, access to barnk financing is
positively related to labor productivity growth. The country dummies are used to account
for the unexolained variation due to differences in the legal and regulatory environ ±ent,
the location of the  country, and  the inherited industrial  mix  and  i-nfrastructure.  The
results  are re-ported in  Table 5 for the whole  samrple.  We  choose not  to  interpret the
magn.it-ude o1f  the  coefficients,  given  the  tenuous  nature  of  the  samrtpte's
representatlveness,  Instead, the locus is on th.eir  signs and significance.
Tie  evidence  or  owAnership  types  is not  robuLst  across  the three  restructuring
me-asures, and  does  not  ex-plain m-uch of  the  variation  as  only  two  of  the  fifteen
coe,+fficients  are statistically significant  State ownership is always associated with less
restructunmrng  (a negative parame.ter estimate) but  this  association  is  never significant.
Employee ownership is also associated wNith  less restructuring in the first two regressions,
out again the association  is not  sivnificant.  Ianagerial  ownership and  local  outsider
ownership are weakly associated with. mnri-e  restructuring on all three measures,  Only
foreign  outsider  ow.nership  is  significantly  positive1v  associated  with  enterprise
restrUcturingear,  on two of  thr  tee  measures>
clor origin is rarely Signifcanrt  in exzplainin-g  ente prise restruturing,  but sector
dummires  are always jointlv s`nificeant. T'he Metals and Machinery sectors are associated
with less restprcturing, whiIe the Wood and Furniture and ihe Food and Beverage sectors
are positiIvely associated with restr  ctrng.  This pattern is hardly surprising, since the
enteqprises in the light industry sectors (food. textiles, furniture) did not  experience as
muclh  dlrop  in demand as the heavy industry sectors d-uring  the transition perion.
The pattern  of country-dunmmy  coefficin,ts  weakly supports the conclusion that
Kyrgyz firms  have  restructured  the most,  wvhile  Georgian  6and  Moldovan  firms  have
restructured the least.  The t-statistics on ihe countiry coefficients  also s-uggest that as
muoln  as  Lwo-thirds  of the expianatory power of the regress.ons depend on cross-country
differences.  Since we have already accounted ior sector and ownership com-position,  the
omitted variables  (proxied by the count,ry-dummies) are likely  the legal  reform efforts
an7d  the  su'bseaiuent implementation  of  new laws  an,d regulations  which  improve  the
restructuring environment.
6 We  also  run the regressions  on Russiar  firms  oial.  Tlhe effects  of  ownershin  structure  reveal  similar
patterns, with forengn outsider  variables  losing their  significance.
13Table 5: Regression  Analysis, Linear  Relation
The numeraire for industries is Pharnaceuticals;  the numeraire for countries is Russia.  Labor Productivity Growth is
defined as the log-difference is the inflation-adjusted value of total sales in 1997 and 1995. Sale of Assets is a discrete
variable equal to  I if the company reported sales in the 1995-97 period, 0 otherwise.  Minor  Renovations is also a
discrete variable equal to I if the general manager reported some improvements to the buildings, 0 otherwise. Absolute
values  of  t-stats  are reported  in  parentheses.  A  constant tern  is  included  in  all regressions.  The number  of
observations is 960. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 10% level.
Explanatory Variable  Labor  Productivity  Sale of Assets  Minor Renovations
Growth
Ownership Types
Managers  0.02  0.03  0.01
(1.41)  (I.i7)  (0.28)
Employees  -0.01  -0.00  0.02
(0.54)  (0.32)  (0.84)
The State  -0.03  -0.00  -0.02
(1.37)  (0.56)  (1.41)
Local Outsiders  0.02  0.02  0.03
(1.21)  (1.51)  (1.34)
Foreign Outsiders  0.04  0.03*  0.01**
(1.08)  (2.11)  (1.75)
Individuals  0.00  -0.00  -0.00
(0.34)  (0.47)  (0.85)
Industry Dummies
Metals  -0.08  -0.16*  -0.08**
(0.79)  (2.18)  (1.76)
Chemicals  0.29*  -0.08  -0.15
(2.19)  (1.67)  (1.37)
Machinery  -0.03  -0.09*  -0.27*
(0.29)  (2.38)  (3.54)
Wood and Furniture  0.09  0.24  0.19**
(0.64)  (1.24)  (1.84)
Construction Materials  0.26**  -0.18  0.07
(1.76)  (0.35)  (1.44)
Textiles and Apparel  -0.25*  0.28*  0.27
(1.97)  (3.24)  (1.57)
Food & Beverage  0.22*  0.15  0.28*
(1.99)  (0.64)  (3.12)
Country Dummies
Georgia  0.25*  -0.06*  -0.08*
(10.42)  (4.15)  (1.97)
Kazahkstan  0.06  0.02  0.05**
(0.77)  (0.45)  (1.83)
KyrgyzRep.  0.10*  0.17*  0.15*
(3.64)  (3.19)  (4.18)
Moldova  -0.17  -0.03  -0.01
(0.56)  (1.05)  (0.66)
Ukraine  -0.06  0.01  0.  19*
(0.86)  (0.68)  (6.78)
Adjusted R2 0.21  0.19  0.27
145.3. Piecewise-Linear Relations
We next divide ownership in three categories - below  10%, between  10% and
30%, and above 30% - following on McConnell and Servaes (1990). The idea is to  test
whether  some  non-linearities  exist  in  the  relation  between  ownership  structure  and
enterprise restructuring. Such non-monotonic associations are predicted by the theorv but
may not hold  in  the rapidly changing  environment of enterprises in  transition,  where
outside  factors  play  a  predominant  role.  Surprisingly,  however,  we  do  find  somne
interesting patterns when we use piecewise regressions (Tables 6 and 7).
Table 6:  Ownership  Structure  and Restructuring,  Piecewise Relation
(Labor  Productivity  Growth)
Note:  Absolute values of t-stats are reported in parentheses.  A constant term is included in all .eress:ons.  Tihe
number of observations is 960. * Significant at the 5% level;  ** Significant at the 10% level.
Management  Employees  The State  Local  (Outsiders  Foreicn  Individuals
Outsiders
OWNE 0 lo)  0.04*  0.03**  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.30
(2.24)  (1.74)  (1.13)  (1L44)  (0.89)  (0.21)
OWN[: 0 30)  -0.02**  -0.02  -0.02  0.01  0.02  -(0.0l
(1.78)  (1.24)  (1.34)  (0.23)  (1.42)  (0.84,
OWNJ 3 0 ,0)  0.02**  -0.01  -0.04  -0.0t**  0.04*  001
(1.81)  (0.98)  (1.62)  (1.84)  2.18)  (0.38)
Sector Dummies
Included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Y-s
Country  Dummies
Included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
AdjustedR2 0.14  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.16  0.12
We  find  that  foreign  ownership  is  always  positively  associated  with  labor
productivity growth, but this associationr  is significant only if foreigners ownt lmore  than
30%  of the company (Table 6).  In contrast, the relation between manager ownership  and
productivity growth in non-monofonic, positive at low (below i 0%O)  or high (above 30%)
stakes, but negative at intermediate (between 10% and 30%) levels.  We also show that
ownership by outside local investors is negatively correlated with productivity growth for
high  (above  30%)  ownership  stakes.  Finally,  employee  ownership  is  beneficial  to
restructuring at low ownership levels, but  becomes insigniftcant  at higher levels.  The
ownership by individuals is not a significant deterninant  of labor productivity growth at
any concentration. Given the small number of observations for the last two ownershin,
types, these results may not be representative.
15We next regress asset sales on the same set of explanatory variables and find that
some of the patterns in the relation between labor productivity growth and ownership
structure are present here too.  Foreign ownership is again positively  associated with
labor productivity growth, and this association is significant if foreigners own more than
10% of the company (Table 7).  The relation between manager ownership  and asset sales
is also positive but significant only  for low (below 10%) or high (above 30%) stakes.
Ownership  by  employees,  the  state,  outside  local  investors,  and  individuals  is  not
correlated with asset sales at any concentration.
Table 7:  Ownership Structure and Restructuring, Piecewise Relation
(Sale of Assets)
Note: Absolute  values of t-stats are reported in parentheses. A constant term is included in all regressions. The
number  of observations  is 960. * Significant  at the 5% level; ** Significant  at the 10%  level.
Management  Employees  The State  Local Outsiders  Foreign  Individuals
OWN[O  10)  0.03**  -0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01
(1.89)  (0.82)  (0.66)  (0.51)  (1.01)  (0.84)
OWN[1030)  0.02  -0.02  -0.01  0.01  0.03**  -0.02
(1.41)  (1.17)  (1.10)  (1.12)  (1.92)  (0.66)
OWN[30,100)  0.03*  -0.00  -0.01  0.03  0.03*  -0.01
(2.58)  (0.43)  (1.37)  (1.08)  (3.11)  (1.42)
Sector Dummies
Included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Country Dummies
Included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted R 2 0.10  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.11  0.09
The results from Table 6 and 7 suggest that increasing ownership by managers is
beneficial to restructuring in low and high ownership ranges, but is not beneficial in the
internediate  range. This finding is consistent with  the studies of corporate governance
issues in the US outlined  in Section 2. It is a result of the trade-off between manager
entrenchment and  incentive  alignment. Foreign  ownership is  generally beneficial, but
becomes significantly so only at high ownership ranges. There is no evidence for robust
relation between other ownership types and enterprise restructuring.
7  We also use the minor renovations measure in the piecewise-linear analysis.  The results are qualitatively
similar to the results in Table 7 and are not reported.
166.  Conclusions
We have examined the  empirical relation between  ownership structure  and  enterprise
restructuring for a cross-section of privatized manufacturing firms in six NIS countrnes.
The  linear  analysis  indicates  no  significant  influence  of  ownership  on  the  three
restructuring  measures.  In  contrast,  the  non-linear  analysis  shows  some  significant
relations  between  different  types  of  ownership  and  enterprise  restructuring.  These
findings are consistent with some of the theoretical models of corporate governance in
mature  economies  and  suggest that  the fiture  empirical work on  enterpnrse behavior
dunrng transition needs to distinguish the effects of ownership at different concentra.ion
levels.
We also  find evidence of significant differences  in ownership  structure  across
countries.  These differences are highly correlated with the particular mix of privatization
methods followed, indicative of hysteresis in the ownership transformation process.
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